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The First World War was not merely a clash of empires, it was also a clash within empires. This fact 
remains largely ignored despite the dozens of anticolonial uprisings around the world which erupted 
during, and as a result of, the war. In 1916 alone there were uprisings across French North, West and 
Equatorial Africa, in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, the Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast 
Asia and Ireland. Most of these uprisings were responding both to European efforts to extract 
resources (especially manpower) from the colonies to support the war effort, whilst also taking 
advantage of the reduced presence of European troops in Asia and Africa as men were recalled from 
the colonies to take part in the war in Europe. This article examines anticolonial rebellions in French 
Indochina, especially the attack on Saigon Central Prison in 1916, as a case study in the wider global 
history of anticolonial rebellion during the Frist World War. Examination of this rebellion shows how 
the First World War not only generated the opportunities and challenges which led to a surge of 
anticolonial uprisings around the world, but also changed the political, social and religious character 
of anticolonial struggle in Indochina. This article offers a reappraisal of the global and imperial 
consequences of the First World War, and argues that anticolonialism should be more central in our 
discussion and memory of the conflict. 
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On the night of 2/3 February 1916 Nguyen Anh Hue, sometimes referred to as ‘Professor Hue’ and 
the ‘soothsayer of Saigon’, arrived at the house of a man called Truong Van No, in the village of Cua 
Lap1. He brought with him plans for an insurrection stretching from Cambodia to Cochinchina2 
(southern Indochina), to be launched in less than two weeks. Within days hundreds of rebels, men and 
women, found themselves making active preparations for their own small, local part in a grand 
uprising against French rule in Southeast Asia. Their preparations had not gone unnoticed. French 
authorities had received warning from an anonymous source that the conspirators would gather at 
Truong Van No’s house on the night of 13/14 February. French gendarmes arrived at Cua Lap at 
23.00 on 13 February to find the village abandoned, save for a single house lit up. Inside the French 
found over 100 men and women who had taken oaths before a revolutionary flag3. They scattered 
upon the French arrival. 13 were captured and arrested (ten men and three women). Four more were 
caught trying to swim across one of the countless rivers of the Mekong Delta and escape. Those 
arrested had their houses searched. Inside the French found lances, machetes, sabres, and bamboo 
spears: preparations for an imminent rebellion.  
 
The French raid on Cua Lap did not deter the vast majority of conspirators who had managed to 
escape. They went on to launch an ill-fated attack on Ba Ria and Cap Saint-Jacques the very next 
night: 14/15 February 1916. These attacks were not isolated, but were part of a larger rebellion that 
raged across Cochinchina and into Cambodia. While the rebellion ultimately failed, it was 
2 
 
nevertheless an important moment for anticolonialism in the region, and part of a global trend of 
anticolonial rebellion during the First World War. This article primarily focuses on the signature 
effort of the rebellion in French Indochina in 1916: the attack on Saigon Central Prison. This rebellion 
was sparked, at least in part, by military recruitment, showing how the First World War 
influenced pre-existing patterns of anticolonial rebellion which eventually led to the development of 
nationalist and communist movements in the following decades. Analysis of the attack on Saigon 
Central Prison helps flesh out an under-explored facet of the global impact of the First World War. 
The rebellions in Indochina in 1916 and 1917 were not isolated incidents. Nearly every major French 
colony experienced some form of organised anticolonial resistance during, and as a direct result of, 
the First World War4. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, 
Madagascar, New Caledonia, and Indochina all experienced rebellion of some notable scope5. Similar 
patterns of unrest also developed in the British, Russian, Italian and Ottoman empires during the First 
World War, suggesting a global moment for anticolonialism. These rebellions took place for many 
different reasons, in a wide range of historical, cultural, political and economic contexts. For all their 
contextual diversity, however, the anticolonial rebellions that erupted from 1914 through to the 1920s 
could not help but be influenced by the realities presented by the First World War. Principal among 
these were the reduction of colonial occupation forces across Africa and Asia and the recruitment of 
Afro-Asians for military and industrial service in Europe, often through coercive means. The direct 
influence of aspects of the First World War in sparking anticolonial rebellions across large swathes of 
Africa and Asia demand that we discuss these rebellions as part of both the global experience and 
legacy of the First World War. 
In most mainstream, general histories of the First World War the anticolonial rebellions in Africa and 
Asia have largely been ignored, both individually and as part of a collective experience6. Even in 
Anglophone books more closely focused on Africa in the First World War major anticolonial wars 
like the Volta-Bani and Senussi wars are avoided7. Slowly, however, new research is bringing the 
anticolonial aspects of the First World War into greater prominence. In 2014 Joshua Sanborn wrote in 
his book Imperial Apocalypse: the Great War & the Destruction of the Russian Empire that 
 
Decolonization was a crucial aspect of the war from its beginning right through to its 
end, but it continues to be largely ignored by the mainstream scholarship…. Indeed, 
scholars have generally ignored the dynamic of decolonization even for the later stages 
of the conflict…when the process became virtually impossible to miss8. 
 
The work Sanborn and others have done in recent years on the anticolonial rebellions in Central Asia 
has helped redefine, once again, the limits of what might be considered part of the First World War, in 
its grandest sense. In a similar vein Erez Manela’s The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and 
the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism argued that the First World War constitutes ‘a 
single historical moment’ for anticolonialism; a global affair born of a global conflict9. Other recent 
works confirm this conception of anticolonialism in the First World War as a ‘global’ moment10.  
These rebellions suggest the need to revise the limits of what are generally considered First World 
War histories, and also expand the histories of anticolonialism, decolonisation, and the emerging 
nationalisms in the twentieth century. To effectively do this, these rebellions needs to not only be 




The Saigon-Cholon  Plot11, 1913 
 
The First World War touched more or less every corner of the globe in one way or another, including 
Southeast Asia. A ‘state of siege’ was declared in Indochina on 10 October 1914, two months after the 
war began in Europe, thus giving the colonial administration broad powers for repression and 
economic control, including opening up the courts martial for civil offenses12. In late 1914 and early 
1915 colonial authorities launched a repression of suspected dissidents, arresting an as of yet 
unknown number of people whom the French considered to be potential agitators or revolutionaries13.  
In a rash act spurred by fear of food shortages Indochina was forbidden from selling trade goods, 
especially rice, to nations not allied with France. Given the huge importance of rice exports to the 
economy of Indochina, and Cochinchina especially, this came as a heavy blow to already-struggling 
farmers and agricultural workers14. Fortunately, the export ban lasted for only a matter of weeks. No 
recruitment was expected of Indochina until January 1916, and there was little to no worry of any 
serious insurrection. The Can Vuong (or ‘Save the King’) movement, the last major instance of 
primary anticolonial resistance, was an increasingly distant memory. Smaller scale rebels, like the 
‘pirate king’ De Tham, had largely been mopped up by 191415. Thus, Indochina entered the First 
World War relatively stable and secure, from a French perspective. The conditions of the war would 
change this, however, by introducing new pressures to Indochinese societies and exacerbating long-
standing grievances. Indochina would suffer a series of rebellions from 1916 to 1918. The largest of 
these was the 1916 rebellion in Cochinchina. 
In order to truly understand the 1916 rebellion in and around Saigon we must first look back to 1913, 
and the radical movement of Phan Phat Sanh. Born in 1893 Phan Phat Sanh was the son of a Cholon 
police officer, who spent his youth as a boy servant to a French family16. In 1908 he fled to Siam, 
leaving his life of service behind him to pursue an independent career as a sorcerer and geomancer. 
He learned to read Chinese characters, apparently spent some time in religious seclusion as a monk, 
and eventually made a name for himself in Cambodia and Cochinchina as a respected healer and 
miracleworker adept in both the Buddhist arcane arts and ‘the rough magic of modern Taoism’17. 
Before long Phan Phat Sanh fell in with a pair of revolutionaries (Nguyen Huu Tri, aka Hai-Tri, and 
Nguyen Van Hiep) who together sought to parlay Phan Phat Sanh’s arcane prowess into real political 
power. After a period of building support and resources, during which Phan Phat 
Sanh changed his name to Phan Xich Long, the movement culminated in a bold attempt to foment 
rebellion by attacking French power in Cochinchina at its heart. During the night of 23/24 March 
1913 eight crudely made bombs were planted around critical sites in Saigon and Cholon. Five were 
planted in Saigon; one each outside the Governor General’s mansion (near the stables), in the 
tirailleur Annamite18 camp outside of a barracks and near the French colonel’s office, outside the 
Palais de Justice at the intersection of rue Lagrandière and rue Mac-Mahon, near the tram-tracks 
which led to Hoc-mon, and outside the Arsenal19. The remaining three were planted in Cholon in the 
marketplace, in front of the post office and outside of L’Inspection20. 
Each bomb-planting team had been given potions of invisibility to mask their covert activity. Despite 
such careful precaution the bombs were discovered before they could be detonated. They were 
quickly linked to Phan Xich Long who had been arrested in Phan-Thiet the day before (22 March 
1913) by gendarmes who stopped him in the street after seeing him walk past in sumptuous robes of 
white silk, bedecked in jewellery21. Such clothing would have been suspicious in any case, but were 
doubly so since his (falsified) identity papers listed his occupation as ‘day labourer’ under the alias 
‘Lac’. An investigation of his lodgings in the hôtellerie annamite turned up several other ‘sumptuous’ 
outfits, some of his ‘crown jewels’, a sword, an imperial seal proclaiming his ancestral ties to the 
Ming Dynasty, and also reams of magic spells and invocations designed for combat (rather than the 
normal healing or geomantic spells that one might expect to find on a wandering mystic)22. 
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The plot appeared to have been foiled when on 28 March 1913, four days after the bombs were 
discovered and removed, some 600 peasants wearing white robes and amulets of invincibility slowly 
wound their way through Saigon heading toward the heart of the city23. In theory, they were supposed 
to arrive in central Saigon just as the bombs were going off, at which time a deified Phan Xich Long 
would descend from the heavens and lead them in ousting the French24. French authorities soon 
learned about this strange gathering and quickly disbanded the peasants, arresting 111 of them25. Trial 
proceedings for months, and in some cases were extended into 1914 by lengthy, and often successful, 
appeals by the accused. The initial judgement came down on 13 November 1913. 
Relative to the severity of punishment meted out against Indochinese rebels during the First World 
War the 60 sentences handed down in November 1913 were relatively lenient (at least within the 
brutal context of imperialism). Phan Phat Sanh (Phan Xich Long), Nguyen Van Ngo, Nguyen Van 
Hiep (Hiep), Nguyen Huu Tri (Hai-Tri), Truong Van Phuoc (Huong-Chu-Phuoc) and Nguyen Van 
Mang (Tu-Mang) were all given sentences of forced labour in perpetuity. The other 54 people 
sentenced on 13 November received various sentences. 
Sentence Number of people 
20 years forced labour 6 
8 years forced labour 8 
5 years forced labour 1 
10 years detention 1 
8 years detention 1 
5 years detention 9 
10 months in prison 1 
8 months in prison 24 




Only one person listed, Nguyen Van Ky, was absolved27. Some estimates claim that over 100 people 
were sentenced to some form of punishment (usually small prison sentences) in the wake of the 
Saigon-Cholon affair28. For all intents and purposes the Saigon-Cholon affair seemed to be over. 
 
Unrest in Cochinchina, 1916 
 
Phan Xich Long was scheduled to be deported to Guyana to serve out his life of forced labour. These 
plans were disrupted by the outbreak of war in 1914, which made it difficult to arrange the necessary 
shipping to send him there29. This inconvenience did not seem to bother French administrators in the 
slightest. Phan’s movement had been decried as the largest contest against French authority since the 
Can Vuong movement, even feared as a movement that was ‘clearly insurrectional and, it must be 
said, nationalist’, but it was now over and peace reigned in Cochinchina and Cambodia30. Reading 
reports from the Governor of Cochinchina, Jules Maurice Gourbeil, and the Governor General of 
Indochina (first Joost van Vollenhoven and later Ernest Roume) in the 19 months between the 
outbreak of war and the attack on Saigon Central Prison in February 1916 one is struck by the image 
of calm and loyalism that is projected. In Cambodia French reports claimed, probably correctly, that 
the mass of the population seemed completely uninterested in the war, and did not seem to see it as 
any sort of opportunity to oppose French rule31. While some revolutionaries like the famous Phan Boi 
Chau did see the war as an opportunity to strike, they were not in a position to do anything about it 
(Phan himself was imprisoned in China from 1914 to 1917, during which time he produced many of 
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his most famous writings)32. What unrest there was mostly concerned the normal friction between 
mountain and lowland peoples, pirates and buffalo thieves. Reporting in early 1915 Gourbeil noted 
that: 
The mind-set of the Annamite population remains excellent; the indigenes, who have continued to 
follow news of the war with real interest, no doubt share our complete confidence in the triumph of 
our arms and their attitude suggests that…the current conflict could inspire them to better appreciate 
the benefits they already receive, and those that they still hope for in the future, by their closer and 
closer collaboration with France33. 
Gourbeil’s naïve, or more likely calculated, optimism glosses over a situation that was not entirely 
free from tension. Despite official declarations of loyalty from Cochinchinese delegations to the 
French colonial regime French officials decided it was best to take precautions against any potential 
unrest before it erupted. In line with metropolitan plans to round up dissidents, pacifists, and socialists 
on the outbreak of war if necessary, Gourbeil ordered the arrest of some known ‘agitators’ in late 
1914/early 1915. These included ‘Tu-Mat’, one of the principle figures in the Saigon-Cholon Plot, 
who had managed to get an acquittal from the Saigon Court of Appeals in June/July 1913. He was 
arrested in early 1915 and eventually convicted of eight counts related to his seditious behaviour, with 
sentences varying from 5 to 30 years of imprisonment, in December that year34. French administrators 
and police could do this thanks  to Indochina having declared a ‘state of siege’ (état de siège) on 10 
October 1914, which granted broad powers to military officials in the colony, including the use of 
military courts for the general population35. This power would be rigorously used during the war, and 
set the stage for post-war abuses36. 
Reports of relative tranquillity largely persist through 1915. Small matters still cropped up; some of 
them related to the war, others not. Economic issues loomed large, especially when the war began 
distorting the economy, driving up the cost of raw materials like timber, exploding the cost of 
European imports, and generating accusations of war-profiteering by Chinese merchants37. Similar 
economic disturbances occurred all over the world, and while they needed to be managed, they did 
not necessarily pose a critical problem38. There was even some evidence of direct support for the war 
including the vote to authorise a donation 10,000 piasters from Cochinchinese councils to support 
Indochinese volunteers serving abroad. It must be noted, however, that the notables and council 
members able to vote such sums had it in their own interests to express their loyalty to the French 
regime, thus helping ensure their privileged social position. Buried in the general optimism of reports, 
however, was evidence of discontent. This was most notable among those eligible for service 
overseas.  
Following on from the official commencement of Indochinese mobilisation on 1 April 1915 the 
decree of 12 August 1915 made Indochinese recruits from 1913 and reservists from 1912 and 1911 
eligible for service as labourers on the Western Front39. Even before the decree was announced fear of 
being sent overseas to fight in Europe had had a dramatic impact on recruitment. Confirmation of the 
recruits’ worst fears made a bad situation much worse. Recruitment plummeted by nearly two-thirds 
(from 1330 in 1914 to just 460 in 1915), and desertion became rampant: some 30 per cent of the 2000 
reservists called up were ‘missing’ by the end of the year40. Small bands of ‘malefactors’ (deserters 
and ex-prisoners) began to appear in some of the more wild, frontier provinces (especially Chau Doc), 
and a low-level malaise began to gently simmer in the provinces along the Cochinchinese-Cambodian 
border. 
‘Secret societies’ began to operate more openly, and their ranks seemed to swell. One group at Gia 
Dinh was broken up and punished with minor fines/sentences as early as May 1915, but there were 
many more in operation41. These ‘secret societies’ were roundly criticised, repressed and feared by 
French officials who felt that they were at the core of most anticolonial activity in Indochina42. In 
reality they were a diverse body of social, political, and sometimes criminal, organisations that played 
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interesting and vital socio-economic roles in the lives of many Indochinese peasants and labourers43. 
They provided not only a sense of community for the growing number of impoverished farmers and 
landless labourers, but also represented a rejection and replacement of the elite Indochinese society 
that these individuals did not have access to44. Some groups, like the famed Heaven and Earth 
Society, were imported from China and represented an important socio-political framework for the 
region’s substantialethnic Chinese population45. The number and membership of secret societies 
appeared to grow rapidly in the early 1900s, partially as a result of easier travel and communication 
along newly-built infrastructure organised by the French, but also due to the increased French social 
and economic repression of Indochinese life and commerce which compelled individuals to find an 
outlet for their grievances. Secret societies played a major role in the 1913 Saigon- Cholon Plot and 
would play an even larger role in the 1916 Saigon attack. 
Very soon after the recruitment of new Indochinese troops explicitly for overseas service was 
announced on 12 December 1915 the simmering in border regions finally boiled over46. In January 
1916 Governor Gourbeil began to get worrying reports of unrest throughout Cochinchina. Secret 
societies were operating in the open, and when interrogated many members stated that they were 
preparing to rile the population up for a revolution47. Some investigations even turned up bombs or 
bomb-making materials and paperwork indicating a series of vast, and well-organised revolutionary 
societies. The first serious outbreak of violence occurred in Bien Hoa (just north-east of Saigon) on 24 
and 25 January, barely six weeks after recruitment had been announced in Indochina. The initial 
violence broke out at a recruitment rally organised by Cochinchinese elites (the chef du canton of 
Chanh-my-Trung and the notables of Tan Trach village). They had set up near Bien Hoa and began 
exhorting young men to volunteer. Their pleas must not have been very convincing as they were soon 
attacked and ‘mistreated’ by a gang of men some 150–200 strong armed with lances, machetes and 
even a few stolen rifles48. These men then proceeded to go on something of a minor rampage, looting 
communal houses in Tan Trach and dispersing the local population49. The situation may well have 
degenerated into a full-scale riot had not the local French administrator Paul-Louis-Marie (Paul) 
Damprun rushed some Indochinese militia to the scene and began arresting the ‘mutineers’ (most of 
whom fled into the forest). 
The men arrested on the 24th had been taken to the prison at Bien Hoa to await indictment and 
eventual trial. By 17.00 on the 25th they had broken out. A group of 15 prisoners supposedly led by 
Le Van Sot, a prisoner with a record of rebellion and insubordination, managed to catch a guard 
unawares and jump him50. Damprun ran out of his administrative residence to the sight of this 
Indochinese guard laying on the ground and being beaten. As he began shouting and gesticulating to 
get the prisoners to leave the man alone Le Van Sot, armed with a two-metre-long fire pump lever, 
turned towards Damprun and began chasing him. Le Van Sot struck Damprun once on the shoulder as 
he turned and ran back towards the residence. Le Van Sot took another swing at him as he crossed the 
threshold of the residence, but slipped and fell, thus allowing Damprun to grab a hunting rifle, which 
compelled Le Van Sot to quickly retreat to his comrades51. 
While this was happening the other prisoners had broken into the guardhouse, armed themselves with 
carbines and opened fire on Damprun’s residence. The noise drew the attention of the deputy 
administrator Antoine Émile Louis Cuniac (son of the former mayor of Saigon, Eugène Cuniac) and 
the gendarmes who raced to the scene. A general fire-fight broke out between the Europeans and the 
escaped prisoners that lasted some 45 minutes52. Eventually the prisoners fled into the woods, leaving 
two dead and a few wounded (including Le Van Sot). Subsequent pursuit netted six arrests for French 
police and gendarmes. Later that evening, around 23.00, a band of 50 men (some of them undoubtedly 
were escaped prisoners) raided the village of Tan-Uyen, just 15 kilometres from Bien Hoa. The roving 
gang was confronted by the local garde forestier M. Vinot53 and a Vietnamese associate. Two shots 
rang out in quick succession, one of them killing the Vietnamese man and the other grazing Vinot’s 
arm54. After this brief altercation the gang quickly dispersed back into the forest, probably fearing 
reprisal. Gourbeil responded by dispatching eight gendarmes and some auxiliaries to Bien Hoa by 
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automobile the next day (26 January). By this point most of the former prisoners, deserters and 
‘vagabonds’ (people who had left their homes and wandered the countryside to avoid de facto 
conscription) had already disappeared. Those few that were captured were reintegrated into the prison 
system55. 
 
Smaller-scale versions of this sort of unrest were shockingly commonplace across Cochinchina in 
January and February 1916. Large gangs of armed and often tattooed men, deserters, fugitives, 
revolutionaries, religious zealots and simple bandits roamed the country-side pillaging, ransoming, 
and generally harassing the populace56. It was a potent mixture of individuals that had analogues 
in previous periods of unrest, like the Tay Son57. Gangs were seen in Ben Tre, Thu Dau Mot, Cap 
Saint-Jacques, Hoc Mon, Da-Phuoc, My Tho, Chau Doc, and Tay Ninh. In the end 13 out of the 20 
regions in Cochinchina reported gangs of anywhere from 5–6 to over 300 individuals instigating 
violence, stealing and openly parading the presence of their anti-French revolutionary groups58. 
The appearance of so many rebel bands across such a broad geography at the same time as men across 
Indochina were attempting to avoid recruitment suggests a strong causal relationship between the two 
phenomena. All of this built up to a crescendo on the night of 14/15 February 1916. 
 
The Attack on Saigon Central Prison, 1916 
 
Beginning around the Tet Festival (3 February 1916) rumours began to circulate of secret gatherings 
and suspicious individuals slinking around the banlieues surrounding Saigon. The impoverished 
denizens of these areas began to suddenly leave, many of them desperately selling their wares at any 
price to get enough money to flee the city with their family. Early in the morning of 15 February, 
around 03.00, a group of boats disguised as banana merchant vessels floated up to the docks in central 
Saigon. Out of these boats poured somewhere between 100 and 300 rebels dressed in matching 
ceremonial clothing (black vests and white trousers), bearing amulets of invincibility, and carrying 
spears, machetes, cutlasses and a few revolvers59. The men disembarked and split up 
into groups, snaking through the streets from the docks to the Saigon Central Prison. As they 
advanced they began to shout ‘Let’s Free Big Brother!’; they had come to break Phan Xich Long out 
of Saigon Central Prison60. 
 
Within minutes the groups had found themselves joined together again in front of the prison, with 
only a few minor mishaps along the way. One group took the opportunity they had to attack a random 
Frenchman they encountered with their cutlasses, wounding him badly but not killing him. Another 
group loudly protested before the stable doors of the palais du gouvernement before getting bored and 
re-joining their comrades in front of the prison. Reunited, the rebels attacked and killed an 
Indochinese guard, Gnanadicam, but found themselves locked out of the prison and unable to breach 
the sturdy iron doors61. On the other side of the prison walls the French and Indochinese 
guards were quickly issued rifles and cartridges. They opened fire, felling two of the ‘rioters’ in the 
first volley. The main French report describes the scene thusly: 
 
We are obliged to believe that, frightened by the terrible effects of French bullets which had dropped 
several of them despite the virtue of their talismans [of invulnerability], they no longer dared to 
commit to a renewed attack [on the prison], and instead fled rapidly to Cholon, where they hoped to 
find a safe haven and perhaps some reinforcements62. 
 
Despite the confusion French reports claimed that the rebels actually retreated in good order, 
marching under red banners proclaiming allegiance to Phan Xich Long. The rebels that remained 
(some undoubtedly fled at this point) began to march towards Cholon where they hoped to at least 
pillage the marketplace before daylight broke and they would have to disperse. French gendarmes 
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pursued them in a commandeered tram, eventually catching up to them at the Station des Rizeries and 
disbanding the group with rifle-fire. In full flight the rebels fled west into a group of houses that had 
suffered a fire just days earlier, marking up their hands, faces and ceremonial silk trousers with thick 
soot. Cholon police, alerted to the disturbance, had mustered and began searching the area for 
dispersed rebels, easily identified in their soot-covered uniforms. Among them they found none other 
than Nguyen Huu Tri (Hai-Tri), one of the leaders of the gang who had managed to get himself 
acquitted for his role in the Saigon-Cholon Plot three years earlier, wounded and still carrying his 
bloodied lance63. By the end of the affair 8 men had been killed (including the guard Gnanadicam) 
and 65 had been arrested64. 
 
The sheer scope of the rebellion was staggering, and sent shock waves that stretched all the way to 
Paris and the office of the Minister of Colonies, Gaston Doumergue. In addition to the attack in 
Saigon bands of rebels attacked the French administrative outpost in Ba Ria and the fortress at Cap 
Saint- Jacques that same night (14/15 February 1916)65. These rebel groups (numbering between 100 
and 200) had coordinated their attacks with that on Saigon Central Prison, pointing to the existence of 
a vast, integrated rebel network66. The Ba Ria attack was led by none other than Nguyen Anh Hue, 
who had been tried, but ultimately acquitted, in the Saigon-Cholon Plot in 1913, further pointing to a 
long-standing organisation67. They carried the same weapons (largely out of necessity), bore the same 
amulets found on rebels who had taken part in the attack on Saigon Central Prison, and even marched 
under a banner proclaiming Phan Xich Long as their leader. The amulets and banners place the rebels 
(both in 1916 and 1913) in the long-running tradition of the Buu Son Ky Huong movement (Strange 
Fragrance from the Precious Mountain), a radical Buddhist revolutionary group that had operated in 
Cochinchina and Cambodia since the Lam San rebellion (1841–1842) and cholera outbreak of 184968. 
 
Cochinchina was a region rife with mystic revolutionaries in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, with major leaders appearing frequently69. What makes the 1916 Saigon attack stand out 
was the cooperation between many different groups across a broad geographic area, suggesting not 
just coordination, but also broadly-felt dissatisfaction with the realities of war-time Indochina. Some 
of the leaders of both the Saigon and Ba Ria attacks (namely ‘Tu-Mat’ in Saigon and Pham Van Khoe 
in Ba Ria) also had ties to the Heaven and Earth Society, a forerunner of the modern Triads70. The 
farrangingunderground connections of these secret societies may well have been truly vast. 
Unfortunately, documentary evidence for the organisation and motivations behind the rebellion are 
very thin. There is one single writing supposedly produced by the rebels appended to the French 
reports on the attack on Saigon Central Prison. The contents of the note, however, are disputed and 
not very helpful71. 
 
Other, less proximate, Indochinese sources are also largely absent. Periodicals aimed at a Vietnamese 
readership were few in this period, and the newer publications that arose from 1916 onwards did so 
with support from French authorities, making them unhelpful in bringing out Vietnamese anticolonial 
voices in this time period72. Many studies on anticolonialism in the region rely, at least in part, on 
studies of documents from the Sûreté Général Indochinoise; however this body was not founded until 
1917. Some fragments of the testimony from accused participants in the rebellion survive, however 
they only form parts of wider documents, rather than being preserved in their original form. 
 
Testimony given by individuals was frequently contradictory. Initial interrogations often found 
suspects expressly saying that they served under the command of Phan Xich Long and sought to 
overthrow the French colonial regime, whereas subsequent interrogations often saw suspects deny 
having any part in the rebellion whatsoever73. French documents state that many of those indicted for 
participation in the attack on Saigon Central Prison claimed that their initial admissions were extorted 
out of them either through violence or threat of violence. While later French reports dismiss this 
possibility it seems more than likely that French authorities used physical violence against accused 
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rebels in the immediate aftermath of their capture. The poor documentary record representing 
testimony from the accused was no doubt exacerbated by the extreme rapidity of the French response 
in the aftermath of the attack. 
 
Unlike in 1913 the French repression was swift and brutal. No longer chained to the civilian legal 
system thanks to the declaration of a ‘state of siege’ French officials in Indochina unleashed a 
sustained repression of dissidents through the courts martial. Whereas many of the key players in the 
1913 plot had managed to win acquittal through the courts of appeal sentences handed down in the 
courts martial were not so easily undone. 17 men were sentenced to death for their part in the attack at 
Ba Ria (8 of them in absentia); 38 were condemned to die for their part in the attack on Saigon 
Central Prison on 22 February, just one week after the attack. The sentences were carried out the next 
day in accordance with the decree of 10 October 1914 declaring a ‘state of siege’ in Indochina74. 
Further investigations and court proceedings led to 13 more individuals being sentenced to death on 
14 March; they were executed the next day75. In the months that followed a vast repression of secret 
societies was carried out, leading to some 1660 detentions and 261 jail sentences76. For comparison, 
an estimated 46 revolutionaries were executed in India during the 
course of the entire war; 60 executions in Cochinchina alone within the space of three weeks 
amounted to a severe repression77. The reprisals were so severe that Cochinchina would not see any 
more secret society uprisings again until the 1920s, helping to pave the way for new nationalist and 
communist organisations to fill the void left by these societies both in peasant social life and in 
peasant political action78. 
 
The Underlying Causes of Unrest 
 
Determining the causes of a rebellion is never an easy task. Human beings are complex, and their 
societies even more so. In the end, we can only bring together a series of grievances and try to 
understand how they touched different people in different ways. This was fundamentally the 
challenge faced by a series of scholars of Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the American War in 
Vietnam. Samuel Popkin (The Rational Peasant: the Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam), 
Ngo Vinh Long (Before the Revolution: the Vietnamese Peasants Under the French) and James Scott 
(Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia), among others, 
grappled with the difficulties of explaining or modelling the political behaviour of rural populations 
(‘peasants’), whose voices and motivations are rarely well preserved79. Each author recounted, in 
some detail, the many injustices and injuries suffered by ‘Vietnamese’ people, but could not do much 
more than that to explain peasant politics, up to and including rebellion. Popkin, for his part, 
addressed the 1916 rebellion in Cochinchina specifically, simply noting that it was due to recruitment 
(this being in line with his principle idea that Vietnamese peasants revolted as an act of self-
defence)80. Popkin’s conclusion about the 1916 rebellion requires substantial nuance, which this 
article will now explore. 
 
In the aftermath of the attack on Saigon Central Prison French authorities tried to determine amongst 
themselves why the uprising had erupted when it did. Most suspicion centred around the context of 
the First World War and the supposed influence of outside agitators: usually in the form of well-
known, exiled nationalist leaders. The trimestral report of the Governor of Cochinchina for the period 
of January to March 1916 (compiled in this instance by Louis Félix Marie Édouard Rivet, then 
assistant, and from 26 April acting, Governor of Cochinchina) suggested that, while the roots of the 
uprising were numerous, the primary causes were the prolongation of the war in Europe, which led 
some to believe that the French were weak and that now would be a good time to strike, and also the 
‘pretext’ of recruitment for the war81. Above all else Rivet blames ‘secret societies’, which he felt had 
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been insufficiently suppressed in preceding years (the maximum penalty for membership of a secret 
society had been 8 days in prison and a fine of 15 francs)82. The bulk of the participants 
in the Saigon attack were disregarded out of hand as ‘naïve peasants’ who had been tricked by ‘fake 
news’ ( fausses nouvelles) into being the unwitting tools of ex-patriated nationalists and their 
agitators, or perhaps even the Germans83. In short, while Rivet (and other French officers and 
administrators) felt that the rebels may have had a range of grievances, the actions and effects of 
the French colonial regime on the lives of poor Indochinese workers and farmers were not principal 
among them84. Colonial authorities downplaying the deleterious effects of colonialism and economic 
exploitation were, of course, by no means unusual. 
 
The French response in the immediate aftermath of the attack largely conforms to this belief. In the 
hopes of trying to at least put a stop to the immediate unrest Doumergue recommended on 24 
February that recruitment in Cambodia and Cochinchina immediately cease, at least until the situation 
improved85. The Governor General of Indochina, Ernest Roume, disagreed and allowed recruitment to 
continue, at least until the one partially-formed battalion of tirailleurs was filled. Roume felt that the 
recruitment had not been a problem in and of itself, but that it was merely taken as an excuse to rally 
support by the exiled Vietnamese Prince Cuong-De, Phan Boi Chau or perhaps even the exiled 
Cambodian Prince Yukanthor Monivong (supposedly supported by German money), 
who he felt were really behind the 1916 attacks (despite all evidence to the contrary)86. In response 
1916 would see the creation of a Section des Affaires Politiques to more closely monitor political 
activity in Indochina, as well as the quiet codification and theoretical improvement of conditions for 
corvée labourers; a subtle suggestion that French administrators were at least somewhat willing to 
entertain the possibility that some of the rebels’ grievances were justified87. 
 
While Cuong-De, Phan Boi Chau and Prince Yukanthor did not have any part in the 1916 attacks it 
was nevertheless true that the rebels were undoubtedly motivated by a range of factors; not just 
recruitment and opportunism88. In order to assess the impact of the First World War on anticolonial 
activity it is necessary to weigh the circumstances of the war against pre-existing and parallel affronts 
and grievances borne by the Indochinese peasantry. De facto corvée labour, for example, was a 
profound source of substantial discontent and anger at the French regime (some suggest it was a major 
contributor to the 1913 Saigon-Cholon Plot)89. On 24 January 1916 some 5000 Cambodian peasants 
protested in Phnom Penh against forced labour on public works, especially 
road building/widening, thus expressing a sentiment that was no doubt broadly felt in Cochinchina90. 
The outpouring of anger in Cambodia over abuses that ultimately stemmed from the French colonial 
regime (even if interpreted and applied by Cambodian agents) grew to comprise at least 30,000 
protesters from all over Cambodia, one of the largest protests of its kind in Cambodian history91. 
Interestingly, the protestors refused to engage with French officials, and appealed only and directly to 
the Cambodian monarchy for help. Given the similarities between conditions in Cambodia and 
Cochinchina, including the vast cross-border connections of the rebel movement of 1916, we have to 
assume similar levels of discontent over corvée labour. Having a monarch to appeal to no doubt made 
a peaceful protest more likely in Cambodia than in Cochinchina, where the only authority that could 
be appealed to was the French. 
 
Corvée labour had technically been outlawed in 1887 but was still in widespread use by the French 
colonial government, and its Indochinese agents, to construct infrastructure like roads, irrigation, 
canals, railroads and dikes (to reclaim inundated land and make it suitable for the cultivation of rice). 
This work was grand in scale and enormously costly. The cost of widening and paving the 180km-
long road from Chau Doc to Soc Trang in 1915, for example, was estimated at 222,000 piasters92. 
This infrastructure played a complex role in generating discontent and shaping the colonial landscape 
across European empires in this period. Most of the work on these systems relied on a mixture of 
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unfree labour and poorly paid contract workers who often lived and worked in abysmally unhealthy 
conditions (including a lack of sufficient food)93. 
 
New transport links were even associated with the widening influence of secret societies, and the 
spread of social ills including opium and human trafficking as organised crime took advantage of new 
means of transportation and communication94. Roads also allowed colonial tax collectors to more 
easily penetrate the countryside, bringing colonialism’s most onerous of financial burdens to more 
and more people95. This was true across European empires96. Rebels in the Volta-Bani War in 
modern-day Mali and Burkina Faso made a powerful statement about the role European roads played 
by sowing millet over French roads as they had ‘no use for them’97. In Indochina, dikes that kept 
fields from flooding were generally classed as ‘public’ work, and therefore subject to construction and 
maintenance via corvée labour, even though the profits made possible by these ‘public’ works were 
thoroughly private, and concentrated overwhelmingly in the hands of large European landowners. 
Forced labour to build vast infrastructure designed to better facilitate European economic exploitation 
of the region was an understandable cause of widespread discontent. 
 
Indochina’s social and economic changes ran deeper than the construction of transportation and 
communication infrastructure. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Cochinchina 
was reformed into a producer and exporter of raw materials (principally rice, but also exotic wood and 
other commodities). Both the exportation of rice and the importation of French manufactured 
goods expanded rapidly. From 1880 to 1937 rice exports from Saigon increased by 545 per cent (from 
284,000 tonnes in 1880 to 1.548 million tonnes in 1937; up from just 57,000 tonnes in 1860), and the 
area cultivated grew by 421 per cent98. In the interwar years Cochinchina became one of the largest 
rice exporters in the world. This increase in production and exportation came not from improved 
cultivation methods (a lack of capital in Indochina generally precluded such development), but from 
the sheer expansion of land being brought under cultivation. From 1900 to 1913 land used for 
growing rice grew from 1,174,000 hectares to 1,766,000 hectares99. By French estimates some 1.4 
million hectares of farmland had been developed due to irrigation and other works by 1925; 89 per 
cent of which (1.25 million hectares) was in Cochinchina100. 
 
Virtually all of the new land brought under cultivation was in the hands of large, absentee European 
landlords who had been granted land concessions. These were largely communal or uncultivated 
tracts of land taken by the colonial administration and then passed along to European investors at 
exceptionally low prices (less than 40 francs per hectare)101. This process was most acutely felt in 
Cochinchina where by 1915 fully 5 per cent of the total land area had been given away as 
concessions102. The expropriation of largely communal lands also undercut an important social safety 
net for struggling peasants who lacked the capital to purchase their own farmland, even if 
Cochinchina did not have the same tradition of set-aside communal lands for struggling and landless 
peasants that was common in Tonkin and Annam103. While setting aside land grants in the Mekong 
Delta had been common practice by the Nguyen Dynasty before the French conquest of Cochinchina 
in the 1860s the size of these grants were much smaller. The sheer scale on which marginal alluvial, 
and later forested, lands were lost from 1860 to 1920 contributed significantly to the immiseration of 
peasants across Indochina104. 
 
While more and more wealth, in the form of land, was being granted to Europeans in Indochina, a 
trade deficit saw money progressively leaving the region altogether. From 1890 to 1939 Indochina 
generally suffered an export-import ratio of 120–130 (meaning Indochina was importing goods worth, 
in total, 20–30 per cent more than they were exporting). This constituted a significant draining away 
of wealth, mostly to metropolitan France where most of the imports came from105. The system of 
granting large land concessions to European investors (consisting of expropriated communal, and at 
times private, land), compelling Indochina to import primarily from France and neighbouring 
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Southeast Asian polities (protecting French exports from competition with their European 
counterparts), and restricting Indochina from selling its export rice freely on the global commodities 
market (an export economy that the French largely created) amounted to a heavy virtual tax on 
Indochinese people106. This system was made acutely painful in the early months of the First World 
War when export of rice from Indochina was barred to any nation not allied with France (although 
this ban was soon lifted)107. Farmers who had grown dependent on the French orchestrated export 
economy faced economic ruin over a war they had nothing to do with. 
 
The transition to an export economy centred on increasingly large plantations and commercial 
farming increased the need for migrant labourers. Most of the demand for migrant labour was met by 
the growing landless rural population, although some were imported from China and India. The loss 
of family subsistence farms was accelerated by simple population growth (there were fewer 
famines during the French colonial period than before, which consequently led to population growth), 
and French tax reforms which came to accept only cash payments, rather than payments in kind108. 
This forced many farmers on the margins to have to sell their plots and become tenant farmers or 
wage labourers. Those with enough capital after the sale to become tenants on what 
had formerly been their land paid substantial rents, sometimes as much as 1/5 of the land’s purchase 
price each year, increasingly to European landlords. Many farmers in the early twentieth century, who 
had previously lived unmonetized lives, found themselves unable to afford the head tax of 0.4–2.5 
piasters a year. According to Samuel Popkin some farmers even resorted to selling their children for 
cash to pay their taxes109. 
 
The sheer financial burden of forced labour and substantially increased taxation (a 1000 per cent 
increase in the first 20 years of French rule in Indochina) to pay for European infrastructural projects 
(the single largest annual expenditure for most areas after administrative costs, representing roughly 
18 per cent of local and federal budgets from 1900 to 1935, rising, on occasion, to as much as 40 per 
cent in 1909) and the maintenance of repressive armed forces represented a stark expropriation of 
wealth from some of the poorest individuals in the entire region110. To make matters worse, efforts to 
collect tax, including monopolies, were actually intensified in periods of economic difficulty as the 
colonial government desperately tried to maintain a steady revenue stream111. Peasants and the urban 
poor were hit doubly hard by any economic downturn. 
 
In addition to head and land taxes the French had set up salt, opium and alcohol monopolies in an 
attempt to generate a reliable flow of revenue for the colonial regime112. While the monopolies began 
in nascent forms as early as 1897, together they grew over the next twenty years into bureaucratic and 
repressive behemoths that reached deeper into Indochinese society than almost any other French 
institution. The monopoly system turned alcohol and opium into necessities (the local population was 
actually given consumption quotas), while making salt a luxury, despite its crucial importance to the 
fishing trade. Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina would come to derive as much as 50–60 per cent of 
their income from these monopolies, thus making enforcement a top 
priority113. This created a system of repression, surveillance, and punitive fines which constituted a 
more substantial and onerous French intrusion into Indochinese life114. Fines for the consumption of 
‘black market’ alcohol could be up to 500 francs (5000 piasters)115. This would have been a fantastical 
sum for your average Indochinese worker who was generally paid from 0.30 to 0.70 piasters a day116. 
The monopolies further encouraged the sort of corporate cronyism that the colonial system thrived on, 
which circles back to the use of corvée labour and the exploitation of the colonised world for the 
profit of European enterprise117. Monopolies also encouraged and rewarded the development of a 
black market for the illicit trade of monopolised commodities. This, in turn, led to the expansion of 
criminal organisations to supply this trade, and to prey upon the increased number of desperate, 
migrant workers expropriated by French policies of land acquisition and heavy taxation. The spread of 
criminal organisations, and with them violence, banditry and human trafficking, was facilitated by 
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French-built transport networks118. All of this combined to greatly increase the level of misery 
suffered by Indochinese peasants and labourers.  
 
With all of these social, cultural and economic woes hitting Indochina at the same time (in addition to 
the above-mentioned changes the education system was also being radically reformed by the French 
in the early 1900s) we should not be too surprised that they experienced rebellious unrest119. Trying to 
determine which of these grievances were the most pressing, the most likely to lead to an outbreak of 
violence, can be difficult. This is doubly the case when we are dealing with movements composed 
primarily of illiterate peasants who do not often leave very good historical records120. There is 
evidence, however, to suggest that the conditions of the war (especially recruitment) were the primary 
drivers for the 1916 attacks; the final affront which demanded an organised response. 
 
Recruitment and the Effect of the War on Unrest 
 
If we consider Samuel Popkin’s 1979 conceptualisation of ‘the rational peasant’ in Vietnam, which 
saw rebellion as a matter of self-defence, the grievances discussed above should have been more than 
enough to provoke anticolonial rebellions, even without the context of the First World War. The sharp 
shock of the war, however, and especially recruitment, cannot be underestimated. The threat of being 
coerced into service, or outright kidnapped, and shipped overseas with no guarantee that an individual 
would ever be able to return home, even if they survived the war, was both profound and, for most of 
the French empire, totally unprecedented. The arrival of a new and immediate threat to family 
integrity and bodily health was bound to engender a correspondingly acute response. A violent 
response was all but assured due to the substantial coercion that was 
involved in recruitment for service in Europe. 
 
Writing in March 1916 Gaston Doumergue, Minister of Colonies in Paris, acknowledged that there 
had been certain ‘abuses’ in the recruitment procedures (namely coercion), blaming them on the 
conduct of Annamite subalterns121. The nature, indeed the existence, of these abuses remains a matter 
of some debate. The most recent and comprehensive work on the subject, Kimloan Vu-Hill’s book 
Coolies into Rebels: Impact of World War I on French Indochina strongly takes the position that the 
Indochinese willingly volunteered for service in Europe, drawn by the ‘wages, bonuses, pensions and 
other entitlements’ promised122. Not only did the economic desperation of Indochinese peasants make 
volunteering a good option in Vu-Hill’s analysis, but the very existence of wages, signing bonuses 
and other entitlements was ‘inconsistent with them having been conscripted’123. Vu-Hill, however, 
fails to question the colonial system that saw so many Indochinese fall to a state of economic 
desperation. Vu-Hill also brushes aside the debates within French government and military 
circles over the issue of true conscription and the obligation it would put on metropolitan France to 
extend citizenship to colonial subjects. Payment and a thin veneer of volunteerism was a way to 
access colonial manpower without having to make any implicit political concessions in return124.  
 
The argument that Indochinese recruits signed up willingly is seemingly rebutted later in Vu-Hill’s 
own book which recounts how ‘village notables in [some] provinces arrested and even chained 
peasants together, forcing them to sign [recruitment] contracts’125. In the worst provinces listed, like 
Tay Ninh, 83 per cent of recruits had been kidnapped and forced to sign up, by Vu-Hill’s 
own account. This does not seem to include individuals who were coerced, threatened or pressured in 
other ways, which means that at some times, in some provinces, the number of true volunteers who 
signed up without being subjected to any coercion (except perhaps basic economic pressure) may 
have been vanishingly small. In other colonies, like French West Africa, French assessments of 
their own recruitment efforts suggested that perhaps as little as 13 per cent of recruits had been true 
volunteers126. There was an understanding by certain colonial officials from across the empire that 
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very few true volunteers were to be found among colonial recruits. The sheer number of desertions in 
1915 and 1916 bear testament to the deep disgust that Indochinese men felt at the 
prospect of being sent overseas (crudely summed up as a lack of ‘patriotic élan’ by the French 
Minister of War, Joseph Gallieni)127.  
 
It is worth underscoring the fact that forced recruitment was commonplace across France’s overseas  
empire. What was happening in Indochina was not unique, but part of an empire-wide pattern of 
coercion. In Senegal recruits were offered up by families under pressure from local chiefs and 
religious authorities, or simply captured by raiding parties and delivered to the French in chains128. 
The situation elsewhere in French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française, AOF) was much the 
same129. In some cases recruits were drummed up by threatening local leaders if they failed to come 
up with enough recruits. In others recruitment was actively incentivized by paying recruiters a set fee 
per ‘recruit’ mustered (effectively turning recruitment into a new slave trade). Throughout the French 
empire would-be ‘recruits’ could either accept their fate, they could flee, or they could fight back130. 
The eruption of anticolonial uprisings spurred by opposition to recruitment in the Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Dahomey and Algeria (among others) should give us some inkling of the severity 
of French measures, and the response they provoked131. The parallels to Popkin’s ‘rational peasant’ 
are striking, and suggest a strong causal link between the war (especially recruitment) and the 
explosion of anticolonial rebellions across the French empire. 
 
The apparent necessity for such brutal recruitment measures is not difficult to understand when one 
considers the sheer level of recruitment that was being aimed at. In January 1916 Maurice Gourbeil 
set out the broad parameters for recruitment in Cochinchina in a telegram to local administrators. He 
set forth a quota of 2000 tirailleurs (combat troops), 3500 stewards and medical workers, 3000 
unskilled labourers, and 50 translators: a total of 8550 men132. To this initial 8550 Gourbeil suggested 
recruiting an additional 15 per cent to make up for any losses due to medical discharge, thus raising 
the minimum target to 9832 recruits. This was a truly fantastic number when one recalls 
that Cochinchina had only managed to raise 460 recruits for home service in 1915. To put this further 
into perspective: all of Indochina had 16 battalions (roughly 14,000 men) in 1914133. Expecting the 
Cochinchina alone to drum up 9832 new recruits in their first recruitment drive seems optimistic, even 
if Indochina ultimately did send 50,000 troops to serve in Europe (half the 
number originally sought)134. 
 
All of this is not to say that every recruit was kidnapped or otherwise coerced into service. There are 
many examples of wealthier families sending their sons to fight for the French, undoubtedly in 
expectation of gaining or maintaining favour with the colonial regime (members of Cambodia’s royal 
family took a substantial role in the war, for example, both serving and overseeing recruitment)135. For 
recruits of more modest means some were undoubtedly happy to volunteer in exchange for reliable 
pay, and no small number were indeed excited at the prospect of overseas adventure. These feelings, 
motivations and expressions (themselves potentially fleeting, or at any rate subject to change) do not, 
however, mean that no one was coerced into service, or that no one was justifiably angry about the 
French recruitment programme. A policy does not need to be universally disliked to spark a rebellion. 
It only has to enflame enough people to plan and carry out the uprising. An uprising was made more 
feasible not just by the existence of a strong grievance and acute threat, 
but also by the weakened French presence in Indochina (and throughout their overseas empire) during 
the First World War. 
 
The belief that France was being severely weakened by the war was a common response to the 
reduced European presence in Asia and Africa during the war136. The reduction of French troops in 
Cochinchina from 3956 to 2387 between August 1914 and March 1916 combined with the 
simultaneous expansion of Indochinese tirailleurs from 2873 to 3257 in the same period seemed to 
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bear out the belief in French weakness137. In Tonkin the trend was even clearer: the number of French 
troops fell from 5733 to 3886 whereas Indochinese troops increased from 8735 to 10,633 in this same 
period138. In total the number of troops in Indochina quickly fell from 23,000 before the war to below 
18,000, three-fourths of whom were Indochinese, within months of the outbreak of war139. Substantial 
and wide-ranging pressures combined with a weakening of the French presence in Indochina created 
both the motivation and the opportunity for rebellion. 
 
The outbreak of war did not just leech away French soldiers from Indochina, it also prevented Phan 
Xich Long from being exiled to French Guyana in 1914 (shipping capacity was limited and had to be 
closely managed)140. Phan Xich Long’s presence in Saigon Central Prison gave the rebels a figurehead 
around which to rally, and probably allowed Phan to remain in contact with his supporters; the central 
prisons were in the heart of the city and prisoners had relatively easy access to communication with 
the outside141. If the First World War had not occurred when it did there is no reason to believe that 
Phan Xich Long would not have been successfully exiled to French Guyana, and without the acute 
unrest that arose from French efforts to recruit Indochinese soldiers for 
the war in Europe revolutionaries would have found it difficult to muster so vast and bold an 
organisation as they had in 1916. It should be noted that in 1916 the attackers were mostly (perhaps 
entirely) male, being largely deserters and other refugees. In 1913, by contrast, the peasants that 
proceeded down into central Saigon in their ceremonial dress were men and women, sometimes whole 
families, from villages and regions that had not previously shown signs of widespread unrest142. Those 
who took part in the 1916 attack were those most likely to be directly affected by the French 
recruitment policies. 
 
If the war was not the only cause of the widespread violence in 1916 neither could the violence have 
occurred without the war. This violence was not merely an Indochinese problem, but wracked French 
North, West and Equatorial Africa. The fact that 1916 was also the most aggressive year for French 
colonial recruitment until 1918 should not be ignored143. This violence must be viewed as a symptom 




The attack on Saigon Central Prison, and the broader unrest in Cochinchina, was not the only incident 
of anticolonial rebellion in Indochina during the First World War. There were two other incidents 
worth briefly discussing for their relevance to the broader history of anticolonialism in the period, and 
for the part they play in the evolution of anticolonialism and nationalism in Vietnam. The first of 
these was the Duy Tan rebellion. Duy Tan, the boy-emperor of Vietnam since 1907, was only fifteen 
in 1916 when he found himself swept up in an abortive uprising against the French. One of his 
mandarins, Tran Cao Van (himself a geomancer, like Phan Xich Long), thought they might have a 
window of opportunity in May 1916 to launch an uprising in the capital of Hué144. He was aware of 
the gross dissatisfaction of the men recruited for military service in Europe and sought to tap into their 
discontent to provide troops for a monarchist uprising145. His plan was to sneak Duy Tan out of the 
palace, get him out into the mountains, and then rally discontented runaways and deserters to their 
cause. During their preparations the French resident managed to catch wind of the plot and confined 
all local Indochinese soldiers to their barracks, thus effectively bottling up potential support for the 
uprising. Unaware of this, Tran Cao Van and Duy Tan made their attempt on the night of 2/3 May and 
were caught very shortly after146. Duy Tan was exiled to Réunion; six of his mandarin co-conspirators, 
including Tran Cao Van, were executed while others were imprisoned147. 
 
While the extremely short-lived nature of the attempted rebellion may make Duy Tan’s rebellion 
seem unimportant, the fact that the plan fundamentally rested on the well-known discontent over 
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French recruitment for service overseas bears witness to the widespread reaction many had to 
recruitment in the First World War, and its power to spur anticolonial movements. Duy Tan’s 
rebellion is also interesting as the last monarchist uprising in Vietnamese history. A year later, an 
early nationalist uprising in Tonkin, in which some members had already been convicted of resistance 
against the French over the issue of recruitment, would chart the path forward for Vietnamese 
anticolonialism. 
 
The uprising at Thai-Nguyen Penitentiary in 1917 was unlike previous uprisings. It was neither 
religious nor class-based in its foundation. It consisted of people from all over Indochina and from all 
different walks of life: from simple brigands, to intellectuals, peasants, disillusioned soldiers, and 
seasoned guerrilla fighters; all of whom were imprisoned together at the Thai-Nguyen Penitentiary148. 
The specific details of the uprising have already been exhaustively covered by Peter Zinoman, both in 
his book The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862–1940 and also in a 
separate article; we need only very briefly recount the rebellion’s key features here. 
The rebellion erupted at Thai-Nguyen during the night of 30/31 August 1917 initially due to the harsh 
abuses of the French résident, Darles (under whose watch some 670 prisoners had died in the first 8 
months of 1917), although wider concerns and anticolonial sentiment fed into the process149. In 
addition to the diverse status, experience and background of the rebels in Thai-Nguyen the rebellion is 
notable for its nationalist rhetoric and symbolism. A Vietnamese national flag was displayed in the 
penitentiary during the course of the first night (alongside a few severed heads). The flag itself was 
not just a nationalist symbol, but had elements of Pan-Asianism. The yellow of the five stars (one for 
each region of Indochina) was meant to represent all Asians, and the red field represented Vietnam. 
 
The rebels issued a decree on 31 August 1917, no doubt heavily influenced by the intellectual leader 
of the uprising Luong Ngoc Quyen, a revolutionary whose career dated back to the early days of the 
Dong-Du movement in 1905150. It decried the many injustices Indochina had faced (including the 
recruitment of troops for service in Europe), and announced 
 
The five-star flag has been raised; we have proclaimed independence. We are all brothers in the 
countries of Annam, intelligent men to whom education has been able to suggest some useful 
measures. Men of good health, aid us with your arms. Allow us to mobilize you, and you may join us 
to destroy our enemies151. 
 
Further decrees from the ‘Grand Chief of the liberating army of Thai-Nguyen province’ lament the 
state of ‘our country, Nam-Viet’ and lay out the many complaints the rebels have against the ‘French 
pirates’ who have humiliated and pillaged their ancestral homelands, including proud (if often 
factually inaccurate) references to previous rebellions, including those of Phan Xich Long152. The 
implication is clear: the rebellion at Thai-Nguyen was presented as part of an ongoing struggle for 
national independence, even if the previous uprisings discussed were never overtly nationalist. Thai-
Nguyen was an uprising not for Tonkin, but for Vietnam. 
 
Ultimately, the general insurrection was not to be. Rather than launch a guerrilla war the rebels chose 
to dig trenches and try to defend the town, unwittingly inviting the French to fight on terms that well 
suited an army that had spent three years fighting on the Western Front. The rebellion was irrevocably 
broken by French artillery fire within a matter of days (4 September 1917)153. The survivors scattered, 
and fled into the forest from which resistance was maintained until March 1918. Despite its ‘failure’ 
however, the Thai-Nguyen Rebellion was an important moment in the history of Vietnamese 
nationalism, and a fitting capstone to the anticolonial uprisings in Indochina during the First World 
War. The fact that similar nationalistic rhetoric was repeated at another, smaller uprising in Tonkin in 
November 1918, just after the signing of the armistice, should tell us that the early nationalism of 
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Thai-Nguyen was not a flash in the pan, but was rather indicative of its time and place in history154. It 
was a sentiment that existed well beyond the penitentiary’s walls. 
 
In each of the rebellions discussed the First World War plays a greater or lesser part, offering both the 
opportunity and the impetus for bold anticolonial insurrections. Rather than a mere backdrop the war 
played an integral role in these rebellions, which in turn played critical roles in the longue durée 
struggle for independence across much of Africa and Asia. This should not be surprising. 
 
The conduct and aftermath of the First World War is already credited with paving the way for social, 
cultural and political trends around the world that reverberated throughout the rest of the twentieth 
century, and in some cases beyond. Anticolonialism and the beginnings of later nationalism should be 
recognised as part of the wave of change that the First World War engendered or instigated. While the 
anticolonial uprisings in Indochina were not caused solely by the war, they were in many ways 
predicated on realities that the war made manifest; especially the prospect of being coerced into 
dangerous military service overseas. This was true throughout the French overseas empire, with 
analogous events occurring in parts of the Ottoman, British and Russian empires in Africa and Asia. 
The vast geographic and contextual scope of these uprisings strongly suggests that they are part of a 
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